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 1. INTRODUCTION
 In this article, private enforcement under negligence when there is legal
 error and litigation is costly is examined. Ordover (1978) demonstrated that
 in a negligence regime in which there is no legal error and litigation is costly,
 equilibrium requires the presence of actors who refuse to obey the due-care
 standard. Accordingly, in such a negligence regime, an undercompliance
 equilibrium must result. Since the existence of litigation costs implies that
 the socially optimal level of care is greater than that required by the tradi-
 tional Hand formula, which defines negligence as a failure to take care where
 the cost of taking care is less than the expected loss if the accident occurs, 1 it
 is a short step from Ordover's undercompliance result to the conclusion that
 injurers,2 under negligence, exercise less than the socially optimal level of
 precaution (see Hylton).
 It is demonstrated that, because of legal error, an undercompliance equi-
 librium need not result under negligence. In a negligence regime in which
 courts err and litigation is costly, perfect and overcompliance equilibria are
 For helpful comments I thank Ian Ayres, John Donohue, David Haddock, Tom Palay, Peter
 Siegelman, and two anonymous referees.
 1. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand formula is
 the traditional due-care standard under negligence.
 2. It should be noted that this article does not discuss the level of care exercised by
 potential victims, nor does it address the activity levels of injurers or victims.
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 possible. In such equilibria, the probability of a negligence verdict will
 simply be the probability that the court erroneously finds the defendant
 negligent (i.e., the probability of type-2 error).3 It follows that suits brought
 in perfect and in overcompliance equilibria may be called "false claims" in
 the sense that they are brought against nonnegligent defendants. Indeed,
 the paradox of negligence litigation is that a perfect compliance equilibrium
 is made possible by the existence of actors who bring suit in the expectation
 that damages will be awarded because of error.
 An implication of this analysis is that legal error may be desirable on
 second-best grounds in a negligence regime in which litigation is costly. In
 this model, an equilibrium in which perfect compliance is observed cannot
 occur unless there is legal error, and, more precisely, unless the probability
 of type-2 error is positive.
 Although a perfect compliance equilibrium is shown to be achievable, it is
 also shown that underdeterrence results unless the Hand formula is modi-
 fied to incorporate litigation costs. Whether the equilibrium is one of perfect
 or overcompliance, negligence, as defined by the traditional due-care stan-
 dard, fails to provide incentives for all actors to exercise the socially optimal
 level of care.
 In particular, those actors for whom the cost of taking care exceeds the
 expected losses imposed on others-in other words, those actors who only
 because of error will be held liable under the traditional due-care standard-
 never, as a group, have incentives to exercise socially optimal precaution
 under negligence. The reason is that the traditional due-care standard does
 not take litigation costs into account. Because of this, there will be some
 actors among this group for whom taking care is socially desirable, even
 though the cost of taking care, for such actors, exceeds the expected losses
 imposed on others. They can be compelled to exercise socially optimal pre-
 caution by internalizing society's costs. But this group bears only the losses
 of victims who bring suit under negligence, and even then only when type-2
 error occurs. Since this is insufficient to align their incentives with the social
 desirability criterion, negligence fails to compel this type of actor to exercise
 the socially optimal level of care.
 With respect to those actors for whom the cost of taking care falls below
 the expected losses imposed on others, the optimality of deterrence depends
 upon the type of compliance equilibrium that is realized under negligence.
 Negligence compels this type of actor to exercise the optimal level of precau-
 3. Generally, the definition of type-2 error depends upon the definition of the null hypoth-
 esis. However, this article follows the literature in this area by defining an erroneous decision
 against the defeiidant as type-2 error (see, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell).
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 tion in perfect and in overcompliance equilibria, and less than the optimal
 level of precaution in an undercompliance equilibrium.
 The effects of increases in the probability of error on incentives to sue and
 to take care are then considered. Because the results depend on the type of
 equilibrium that occurs under negligence, the effects are shown to be more
 complicated than is suggested by the recent discussion in Polinsky and
 Shavell. One result that emerges from this analysis is that in a perfect
 compliance equilibrium, negligence is robust in its deterrence properties to
 small changes in the probability of type-1 or type-2 error.
 The standard economic analysis of negligence began with John Brown's
 model in which litigation was costless and courts never erred. In that model,
 potential injurers exercised socially optimal precaution because they com-
 plied with the due-care standard, which was set at the socially optimal care
 level.4
 The standard model was expanded to incorporate costly litigation in Or-
 dover (1978). Generally, taking litigation costs into account introduces sever-
 al considerations to the analysis of liability rules. First, since litigation costs
 raise the social costs of accidents, the optimal care level changes when
 litigation is costly. Second, litigation costs affect the injurer's incentives to
 take care, by increasing the losses suffered by an injurer who is sued (assum-
 ing such an injurer must bear the cost of bringing suit) and by reducing the
 incentive of victims to bring suit.5 Third, because litigation is costly, victims'
 incentives to bring suit will depend on their estimate of the probability of
 winning the suit, as well as on their expected recovery if they win.
 The Ordover article examined compliance in a negligence regime in
 which litigation is costly, and concluded that potential injurers, as a group,
 undercomplied with the due-care standard. This had to be the result be-
 cause if all injurers complied or overcomplied, victims would never win a
 negligence suit. Given that the victim's rational estimate of the probability of
 winning should equal the frequency with which injurers are in fact held
 liable, victims would never have an incentive to bring suit in an equilibrium,
 such as that in the Brown model, in which injurers complied with the due-
 care standard. However, if victims never have an incentive to bring suit,
 injurers will have no incentive to take care.
 In this article, the economic model of negligence is expanded further by
 incorporating costly litigation and legal error.
 4. A more general approach is taken in Diamond, which examines a general due-care
 standard (i.e., one that is not necessarily set at the socially optimal care level). However, if the
 due-care standard is set at the socially optimal care level, the analysis presented in the Diamond
 article suggests that an equilibrium in which potential injurers comply with the standard would
 result.
 5. For a discussion of the first two considerations, see Polinsky and Rubinfeld,
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 2. THE MODEL
 2.1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
 2.1.1. Accident Technology. All actors are assumed to be risk neutral. It
 is also assumed that victims (plaintiffs) are the only parties who suffer loss
 from an accident, the risk of loss to victims can be reduced by the exercise of
 caution by potential injurers (potential defendants), and that it is costly for
 injurers to take care.6
 Let p be the probability of loss if potential injurers do not take care, p >
 0; and q be the probability of loss if injurers do take care, p > q > 0. Let v be
 the (dollar) loss suffered by an accident victim, v > 0. The variable v is
 assumed to be random, with distribution function H(v). Specifically, it is
 assumed that the potential injurer randomly experiences accidents with vic-
 tims, each of whom is capable of realizing a specific dollar loss, and these
 losses are distributed over the population in accordance with the distribution
 function H. Thus, if the potential injurer takes care, the expected loss suf-
 fered by victims is qE(v); and if the injurer does not take care, the expected
 loss is pE(v), where
 E(v) = v d(v). (1)
 o
 Let x be the cost to a potential injurer of taking care, where x > 0. The
 variable x is assumed to be random, with distribution function G(x). The
 value of x is unobservable to potential victims; however, it is observed by the
 injurer, and is known to him when he chooses whether to take care. The
 typical injurer will choose not to take care if the expected cost of taking care
 exceeds the expected cost of not doing so. Thus, unless the injurer is re-
 quired to pay damages for either committing an offense or failing to take
 care, precaution will not be exercised.
 Victims are assumed to be able to sue for no more than the value of their
 loss, v. Let ct, be the litigation cost borne by a victim, c% > 0, and co be the
 litigation cost borne by an injurer in defending himself against a claim, co > 0.
 2.1.2. Legal Error. It will be assumed that courts do not have perfect
 information. Thus, courts are unable to determine accurately in every case
 whether the defendant, whose behavior gave rise to a lawsuit, acted negli-
 gently. With this in mind, let 01 be the probability of type-I error (i.e., that
 the court finds a negligent defendant nonnegligent, 0 < 01 < 1); and let 02
 6. The model is similar to that presented in Hylton, which, in turn, borrows some of its
 basic features from the model presented in Shavell.
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 be the probability of type-2 error (i.e., that the court finds a nonnegligent
 defendant negligent, 0 < 02 < 1).7
 In addition, it will be assumed that courts are sufficiently accurate that 1
 - 01 > 02 and, redundantly, 1 - 02 > 1. The former condition requires that
 the probability that a negligent defendant will be found negligent exceed the
 probability that a nonnegligent defendant will be found negligent; the latter
 requires that the probability that a nonnegligent defendant will be found
 nonnegligent exceed the probability that a negligent defendant will be found
 nonnegligent. The assumption of accuracy is embodied in the following
 condition:8
 1 -010 - 2 > 0. (2)
 2.2. STRUCTURE OF NEGLIGENCE REGIME
 Suit is brought under negligence when wv > c, where w is the probability
 that the jury will find the defendant negligent. Thus, the probability that suit
 will be brought after an accident has occurred is 1 - H(cl/w).
 Under the Hand firmula, an actor is negligent if he fails to take care when
 (p - q)E(v) > x. Any actor for whom (p - q)E(v) > x is potentially negligent,
 in the sense that he will be held negligent if his failure to take care leads to
 an accident which is followed by a lawsuit which the court decides without
 error. It is assumed that victims correctly perceive the probability of a
 negligence verdict, and thus are aware of the requirements of the Hand
 formula. It is also assumed that victims and injurers know 0, and 02.
 Each actor will take care when the cost of taking care is less than the cost
 of not taking care. Thus, a potentially negligent actor [i.e., an actor for whom
 (p - q)E(v) > x] will take care when
 x + q[l - H(clw)][02E(vv > cv/w) + Co]
 < p[l - H(c,lw)][(1 - O1)E(vlv > c,/w) + cj, (3)
 where
 E(vlv > c,,w) = v dH(v)/[l - H(cvlw)], (4)
 7. This article treats the probabilities of type-i and type-2 errors as given, as does Polinsky
 and Shavell. This assumption is made in order to simplify the model. A more realistic presenta-
 tion would allow the error probabilities to depend on the level of precaution and the resources
 invested into altering the probability of error. For a model in which the likelihood of error
 depends upon the level of precaution, see Craswell and Calfee. The investment of resoulces
 into reducing error is discussed in Tullock (1971: 64-75).
 8. This accuracy condition is assumed in Polinsky and Shavell.
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 is the expected damage award given that the victim brings suit. Condition (3)
 can be rewritten as follows:
 x < [1 - HI(cV/W)]{[p(1 - 0,) - q2]E(vlv > cjw) + (p - q)c0}, (5)
 where the left-hand side of (5) is the marginal cost of taking care and the
 riglit-hand side is the increase in liability that results from failing to take
 care. Obviously, when the latter is larger than the former, the potential
 injurer will take care.9
 An actor that is not potentially negligent [i.e., for whom (p - q)E(v) < x]
 will take care when
 x + q[l - H(c,/w)][02E(vlv > c,/w) + cj]
 < p[l - H(c/w)][02E(vlv > c,,w) + c], (6)
 or equivalently, when
 x < [1 - H(ct,/w)](p - q)[02E(vlv > clw) + c]. (7)
 Since actors perceive the likelihood of a negligence verdict, w is
 w = s(l - 1) + (1 - s)02 (8)
 where s is the probability that the injurer is negligent (i.e., potentially
 negligent and fails to take care), given that an accident has occurred. The
 first term in (8) is the probability that the defendant is negligent and not
 found nonnegligent by the court; the second is the probability that the
 defendant is not negligent but is nevertheless found negligent by the court.
 Using Bayes' theorem,0l that probability is expressed as follows:
 s = p[gnq + (1 - g,,)p]-
 (p - q)E(v)
 x f dG(x), (9)
 [1 - HI(cJw)l{[p( 1-01 )-qO2]E(vIv>c,/w)+ (p - q)c,}
 where g,, is the probability that a potential injurer will take care under
 negligence and is given by
 9. It should be noted that condition (ii) and the assumption that p > q guarantee that p(l -
 01) - qO2 > 0.
 10. Expression (9) is the probability of a negligence verdict, given that an accident has
 occurred. If victims are rational, as assumed here, they will update their forecasts of the
 probability of a negligence ver-dict using the information that an accident has occurred.
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 [1-H(c ,w)]{[p(l-e )-qo2]E(vlv>cuIw)+(p-- q)co}
 g.=- dG(x).
 0
 Note that w can be rewritten as
 = 02 + (1 - - 0 )- . (10)
 Equilibrium in a negligence regime requires that the probability of a
 negligence verdict (i.e., w) be positive and satisfy (8) or, equivalently, (10).
 The reason w must be positive is that if it were zero, victims would not bring
 suit. Of course, if victims refuse to bring suit, injurers would have no incen-
 tive to take care, and this could not be an equilibrium (see Ordover, 1978).
 2.3. EQUILIBRIUM AND COMPLIANCE WITH DUE-CARE STANDARDS
 In this section I examine whether, in an equilibrium under a negligence
 regime, actors obey the due-care standard. I will describe the results in
 terms of compliance with the standard. A state of undercompliance exists
 when there are actors for whom (p - q)E(v) > x and the threat of liability is
 insufficient to lead them to take care. Overcompliance occurs when the
 threat of liability causes some actors for whom (p - q)E(v) < x to take care.
 Perfect compliance is observed when only those actors for whom (p - q)E(v)
 > x are led by the threat of liability to take care.
 A preliminary result should be established at this point.
 Proposition 1. As long as courts are sufficiently accurate that condition (2)
 holds, the increase in liability that results from failing to take care is greater
 for a potentially negligent actor than for one who is not potentially negligent.
 To prove this, note that for a potentially negligent actor, the increase in
 liability that results from failing to take care is given by the right-hand side of
 (5). For an actor who is not potentially negligent, the increase in liability is
 given by the right-hand side of (7). It is straightforward to show that the
 former is larger than the latter if and only if condition (2) holds.
 The importance of Proposition 1 will become clear later in the text.
 However, its basic thrust is that if courts operate with sufficient accuracy,
 potentially negligent actors have greater incentives to take care than do
 actors who are not potentially negligent. In this sense, negligence can be
 said to discriminate between different types of actors. It follows that if courts
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 are so inaccurate that condition (2) fails to hold, potentially negligent actors
 may have less incentive to take care than others.ll
 As noted earlier, an equilibrium value for the probability of a negligence
 verdict satisfies (8). Plaintiffs will bring suit only if the probability of a negli-
 gence verdict is positive. Notice, however, that (8) implies the following
 compliance equilibrium configurations.
 Proposition 2. Under negligence, three types of equilibrium are possible: (i)
 one in which the probability of a negligence verdict exceeds the probability
 of type-2 error (w > 02) and there is undercompliance; (ii) a second in which
 the probability of a negligence verdict is equal to the probability of type-2
 error (w = 02) and there is perfect compliance; and (iii) a third in which the
 probability of a negligence verdict is equal to the probability of type-2 error
 (w = 02) and there is overcompliance.
 This is proven by examining (8) and (9). Consider statement (i) of the
 above proposition first. Note that the probability of a negligence verdict, w,
 is positive if
 (p - q)E(v) > [1 - H(c,/w)]{[p(l - 0,) - q2]E(vlv > c,/w)
 + ( - q)C}, (11)
 in which case s > 0, and (10) implies that w > 02. But (11) holds if and only if
 there is undercompliance among potentially negligent actors. Furthler, given
 Proposition 1, condition (11) implies that actors who are not potentially
 negligent will not take care. Thus, tle equilibrium is one of under-
 compliance.
 Statement (ii) is true if
 (p - q)E(v) c [1 - H(Cvlw)]{[p(1 - 0,) - q02]E(vv > Cv/w)
 + ( - q)c0}, (12)
 and
 (p - q)E(v) > [1 - H(c,lw)](p - q)[02E(vv > c,,w) + co]. (13)
 Under this set of conditions, only potentially negligent actors will take care.
 Furthermore, (12) implies that w = 02.
 11. Specifically, if the inequality in condition (2) is reversed, potentially negligent actors will
 have less incentive to take care. If the inequality is replaced with an equality, the increase in
 liability will be the same for both types of actor.
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 Finally, statement (iii) requires that (12) hold and
 (p - q)E(v) < [1 - H(cvw)](p - q)[(02E(vlv > c,lv) + co, (14)
 where (12) implies w = 02. Under this set of conditions all potentially
 negligent actors will take care and some actors who are not potentially
 negligent will take care.
 This demonstrates that Ordover's result that a rational expectations equi-
 librium in a negligence regime requires the existence of actors who refuse to
 obey the due-care standard does not hold in a regime in which courts err.
 The reasoning behind Ordover's proposition is straightforward: if under neg-
 ligence, all potentially negligent actors [those for whom (p - q)E(v) > x] take
 care, then no plaintiff will expect to win a lawsuit, so suit will not be brought;
 however, if suit is not brought, no actor will have an incentive to take care.
 This argument is no longer valid when it is accepted that courts make mis-
 takes. For in such a negligence regime, plaintiffs will continue to bring suit
 even when all injurers are obeying the due-care standard. However, because
 plaintiffs have rational expectations they will in effect know that the proba-
 bility of a negligence verdict, in a perfect or in an overcompliance equi-
 librium, is just the probability of type-2 error.
 It might be said that all claims brought in perfect and in overcompliance
 equilibria are "false" or "nuisance" claims. In one sense this must be so
 because all potentially negligent actors are taking care in such equilibria.
 However, given that plaintiffs have rational expectations, it seems appropri-
 ate to say that, in perfect and in overcompliance equilibria, plaintiffs bring
 nuisance suits in the sense that their claims are brought in the expectation
 that damages will be awarded because of error.
 This description of suits is not appropriate in an undercompliance equi-
 librium. For in such an equilibrium, there is a positive probability, from the
 viewpoint of the plaintiff, that the defendant negligently failed to take care;
 and since the plaintiff does not observe the injurer's cost of taking care, it
 cannot be inferred that plaintiffs are bringing false claims.
 It should be noted that Proposition 2 depends on the accuracy condition
 stated in (2). This implies that peifect compliance is impossible under negli-
 gence unless courts achieve a reasonable degree of accuracy. A perfect com-
 pliance equilibrium is possible only because the increase in liability that
 results from failing to take care is greater for potentially negligent actors.
 Because of this wedge between the marginal liability costs of the two types of
 injurer, it is possible for an equilibrium to result in which only the poten-
 tially negligent have an incentive to take care.
 A second implication of Equations (8) and (9) is the following.
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 Proposition 3. A necessary condition for perfect (or over) compliance is 02 > 0.
 That is, perfect compliance requires that the probability of type-2 error
 be nonzero. If the probability of type-2 error is zero, plaintiffs will sue only if
 the probability that the defendant acted negligently is positive, which cannot
 happen in a regime of perfect compliance. Thus, complete prevention of
 type-2 error12 would eliminate incentives to litigate against defendants who
 have obeyed the due-care standard, which is the type of litigation that occurs
 in perfect and in overcompliance equilibria. However, when litigation is
 costly,13 prevention of type-2 error would have the less desirable effect of
 producing a negligence regime in which only an undercompliance equi-
 librium can result.14 An additional implication of Proposition 2 is that an
 overcompliance equilibrium should in principle be distinguishable from an
 undercompliance equilibrium by comparing the probability of a negligence
 verdict with the probability of type-2 error. 15
 2.4. OPTIMALITY OF CARE
 This section examines whether the care levels of injurers in a negligence
 regime will be socially optimal.
 Given an equilibrium in a negligence regime, taking care is socially desir-
 able if, after the realization of x,
 12. In theory there are two ways in which type-2 error could be virtually eliminated. One is
 to make the standard of proof as high as possible: for example, requiring that the evidence prove
 beyond the slightest doubt that the defendant acted negligently. Negligence verdicts would
 almost never occur, but the rate of type-2 error would be driven close to zero. A second
 approach is to make technological improvements in the gathering of evidence: for example,
 using lie detector tests in court. For discussion of the latter approach, see Tullock (1971: 76-
 104).
 13. I emphasize the presence of litigation costs because the undercompliance result of
 Ordover depends upon litigation being costly. If litigation were costless, perfect compliance
 would result. [See, e.g., Ordover (1978, 1981).]
 14. Of course, complete prevention of type-2 error is impossible, but continuity implies
 that the same criticism can be offered for efforts to minimize type-2 error. As 02 is driven toward
 zero, the more likely an undercompliance equilibrium is. Perhaps it should be noted here that
 instead of treating the probabilities of type-1 and type-2 error as constants, one alternative is to
 assume that parties attempt to alter these probabilities through investing in litigation. Thus, the
 plaintiff increases c,, in the hope of maximizing type-2 error, and minimizing type-I error, and
 the defendant alters co in a manner that maximizes type-1 error and minimizes type-2 error. For
 the purposes of this article, the interesting implication of such an approach is that under certain
 conditions the parties can, through investing in litigation, affect the type of compliance equi-
 librium that emerges under negligence.
 15. Craswell and Calfee conclude that overcompliance is likely to be common in "a variety
 of situations where the uncertainty is relatively small." The results of the model presented in
 this article may provide a simple way of testing for overcompliance. Tullock (1980: 31-3)
 estimates that the probability of error is roughly k. If 1 can be taken to be the probability of
 type-2 error under a proponderance of the evidence standard, this number might be compared
 with estimates of the likelihood of a negligence verdict.
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 pE(v) + p[l - H(cvIw)](c, + c,)
 > x + qE(v) + q[l - H(cdlw)](c, + c,), (15)
 or, alternatively,
 x < (p - q)E(v) + (p - q)[l - H(c,/Iw)](c + c,). (16)
 The right-hand side of (16) is the marginal social cost of failing to take care-
 or, alternatively, the marginal social benefit of additional care-which is the
 same whether or not the actor is potentially negligent.
 If not all actors for whom taking care is socially desirable have incentives
 to take care under negligence, it will be said that underdeterrence exists.
 Overdeterrence results when there are actors, for whom taking care is not
 socially desirable, who are nevertheless led by the threat of liability to take
 care. Optimal deterrence occurs when only those actors for whom taking
 care is socially desirable take care under negligence.
 The following results are implied by Proposition 2 and the preceding
 comments.
 Proposition 4. In an undercompliance equilibrium, negligence underdeters.
 This is proven by noting that in an undercompliance equilibrium negli-
 gence underdeters potentially negligent actors if and only if
 (p - q)E(v) + (p - q)[1 - H(c,/w)](c, + c,)
 > [1 - H(cvlw)]{[p(1 - 01)- q02]E(vlv > c/w)
 + (p - q)co}. (17)
 However, given (11), this condition will obviously hold in an under-
 compliance equilibrium. In addition, given Proposition 1, actors who are not
 potentially negligent will also be underdeterred in an undercompliance
 equilibrium.
 Proposition 5. In a perfect compliance or in an overcompliance equilibrium,
 (i) negligence underdeters actors who are not potentially negligent; and (ii)
 potentially negligent actors take care and, thus, are optimally deterred.
 Statement (i) of Proposition 5 is proven by noting that whether the equi-
 librium is one of perfect or of overcompliance, actors who are not potentially
 negligent are underdeterred if and only if
 (p - q)E(v) + (p - q)[ - H(c,lw)](c, + c)
 > [1 - H(c,lw)](p - q)[02E(vlv > c,/w) + cj]. (18)
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 But this reduces to
 cJt
 fv dH(v)02 < E(v) + [1 - H(c, /w)] c,
 which, given the definition of E(v) in (1), is easily shown to hold.
 Statement 2 follows from the definition of perfect and overcompliance
 equilibria. In both types of equilibrium, actors for whom x < (p - q)E(v)
 take care. Since, for such actors, the cost of taking care is less than the social
 cost of failing to take care, this is efficient.
 Note that (17) can be expressed as follows:
 00
 I v dH{[p(l - 01) - q02](p - q)} < E(v) + [1 - H(c,w)]c,. (19)
 cJw
 It follows from this that in an undercompliance equilibrium, error can en-
 hance deterrence as long as the difference p(l - 01) - q02 is greater than p
 - q. Since the condition p - q < p(l - 0) - q02 is equivalent to p01 < q(l
 - 02), Proposition 5 implies the following.
 Proposition 6. If p0i < q(l - 02), then error enhances deterrence in an
 undercompliance equilibrium.
 Thus, if the probability of not being held negligent when one has not
 taken care (p80) is less than the probability of not being held negligent when
 one has taken care [q(1 - 02)], then error enhances deterrence in an under-
 compliance equilibrium. An alternative way of stating this result is that error
 cannot enhance deterrence in an undercompliance equilibrium unless the
 condition of Proposition 6 liolds, which places a higher burden of accuracy
 on courts than does condition (ii).16
 A rather disheartening conclusion follows from Propositions 4 and 5:
 given the due-care standard defined by the Hand formula, negligence un-
 16. The desire to structure rules of criminal procedure in a way that minimizes the risk that
 an innocent defendant will be convicted has been expressed as an aphorism that it is better that
 guilty defendants go unconvicted than to convict innocent defendants [see In re Winship, 397
 U.S. 358 (1970)]. Although this a model of civil litigation, such a rule could be seen in terms of
 this model as requiring that p01 < q02. This is not inconsistent with the requirement that pi0 <
 q(1 - 02). Htowever, there is tension between the two conditions because not all values of p01
 and (02 that satisfy the former inequality will satisfy the latter. In light of this, deterrence seems
 to be a questionable argument for sacrificing reductions in the rate at which type-I error occurs
 in order to reduce the fiequency of type-2 error. See Wittman.
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 derdeters. The reason is that actors who are not potentially negligent never
 have incentives to exercise the socially optimal level of precaution. Now it
 may be argued that society should not want such actors to take care, since
 the cost of taking care exceeds the marginal losses imposed on others. [ow-
 ever, in a system in which litigation is costly, this understates the social cost
 of failing to take care; the social cost of failing to take care is the marginal loss
 imposed on others plus the additional litigation costs imposed on society.
 Given this, there are actors who are not potentially negligent, unider the
 Hand formula definition of the due-care standard, for whom taking care is
 still socially desirable. The only way to compel such actors to take care is to
 internalize the social cost of failing to take care. But this clearly happens at a
 socially inadequate rate under negligence because the only costs that are
 internalized to actors who are not potentially negligent are the damages that
 are awarded because of type-2 error. Since this is far below the level of cost
 that should be internalized in order to compel such actors to exercise the
 socially optimal amount of precaution, negligence fails to compel actors who
 would not be required to take care under the Hand formula to exercise the
 optimal level of precaution.
 The failure of negligence to compel all potential injurers to exercise so-
 cially optimal precaution can be corrected by modifying the due-care stan-
 dard to incorporate litigation costs.17 Under such a modified due-care stan-
 dard, negligence would optimally deter in a perfect compliance equilibrium,
 and an overcompliance equilibrium would be infeasible. This is demon-
 strated by observing that because (19) holds, any actor who would not be
 potentially negligent under the modified due-care standard (i.e., any actor
 whose precaution cost exceeds the marginal social benefit of additional care)
 would never take care, whatever the equilibrium. This is a desirable out-
 come because it is inefficient for such actors to take care. However, poten-
 tially negligent actors, given the modified due-care standard, would take
 care in a perfect compliance equilibrium. This, again, is a desirable result
 because it is efficient for such actors to take care. Thus, with the due-care
 standard modified to incorporate litigation costs, optimal deterrence is a
 feasible outcome under negligence.
 It might be asked in light of this discussion whether legal error under
 negligence really imposes costs on society. The typical discussion assumes
 that it does,18 and assumes that the goal of procedural safeguards should be
 to minimize legal error subject to relevant constraints. The results of this
 section suggest that the social desirability of legal error is not so easily
 17. In other words, the Hand formula would have to be modified so that it requires a
 comparison between the cost of taking care (i.e., x) and the social benefit of additional care,
 which is (p - q)E(v) + (p - q)[1 - H(c,,/w)](co + c,).
 18. See, for example, Posner (400-1).
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 determined when litigation costs are taken into account. The social desir-
 ability of legal error depends on the desirability of the alternative state in
 which there is no error. If the state in which there is no legal error is one in
 which injurers take too little care relative to the social optimum, then legal
 error may be a desirable feature on second-best grounds.
 2.5. EFFECTS ON INCENTIVES TO LITIGATE AND TO TAKE CARE
 This section examines the effect of increases in error on incentives to litigate
 and on deterrence. It should be noted that error can be increased in two
 ways. One is to alter the technology or process of evidence production or
 evaluation so that the probability of type-1 or type-2 error increases while
 the standard of proof is held fixed. The other is to alter the standard of proof.
 While it is possible to imagine a technological change that alters the proba-
 bility of only one type of error-for example, subsidizing the defendant's
 production of evidence-an increase in the standard of proof will reduce
 type-2 error and increase type-i error simultaneously. Since the discussion
 below proceeds as if one type of error can be increased without also altering
 the other type, it should be understood as implicitly assuming technological
 change rather than an alteration in the standard of proof. The results, how-
 ever, can easily be applied to the case in which the standard of proof is
 altered.
 2.5.1. Incentives to Litigate. Recall that under negligence, the proba-
 bility that suit will be brought is 1 - H(cvIw). Thus, legal error alters
 incentives to litigate only through its effect on w.
 In light of the foregoing, the effects of error on incentives to litigate
 depend upon whether the type of equilibrium that results is one of over-,
 perfect, or undercompliance. In a perfect or an overcompliance equilibrium,





 It follows that in a perfect or an overcompliance equilibrium, an increase in
 the probability of type-l error will have no effect on the incentive to litigate,
 and an increase in the probability of type-2 error will increase the incentive
 to litigate. The intuition behind this is straightforward. In a perfect or an
 overcompliance equilibrium the probability of a negligence verdict is the
 probability of type-2 error. Since this is assumed not to be a function of the
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 probability of type-1 error, type-1 error is irrelevant insofar as the incentive
 to bring suit is concerned.
 In an undercompliance equilibrium, (9) implies that s = s(w01, 02); where
 as/dw < 0, because if victims are more likely to sue, potential injurers will,
 other things equal, take more care; s/ld02 > 0, because if even the innocent
 will be found guilty, potential injurers will have less incentive to take care;
 and as/daO > 0, because if plaintiffs are less likely to win, because negligent
 defendants are being found nonnegligent, potential injurers will have less
 incentive to take care.19
 In an undercompliance equilibrium, the effect of an increase in type-2
 error on the probability of a negligence verdict is given by the following
 expression:
 aw _ 1 - s + (1 - 0 - 02)ds 2> (20)
 aO2~ 1 - (1 , - 62))s/w 0)
 Thus, in an undercompliance equilibrium an increase in the probability of
 type-2 error increases the incentive to litigate. An increase in the probability
 of type-2 error has this effect for two reasons: first, it increases the plaintiffs
 likelihood of winning against a given defendant, because some nonnegligent
 defendants will be found negligent; second, it increases the amount of negli-
 gent behavior, thus increasing the probability that a given defendant be-
 haved negligently.
 The effect of type-1 error on the probability of a negligence verdict in an
 undercompliance equilibrium is given by the following expression:
 aw -s + (1 - 01 - 2)0s/d01
 (21) ao 1 - (1- 1 - 02)as/aw '
 the sign of which is ambiguous. Thus, in an undercompliance equilibrium,
 an increase in the probability of type-1 error has an ambiguous impact on the
 incentive to litigate. Type-1 error has two opposing effects on the incentive
 to litigate. It lowers the incentive to sue because it increases the probability
 that the defendant will be found nonnegligent. However, it increases the
 amount of negligent behavior and, therefore, increases the probability that a
 given defendant's behavior was negligent. This increases the incentive to
 sue. The net effect of type-1 error on the incentive to sue is therefore
 ambiguous.
 The only other study to examine this issue in a theoretical model, Pol-
 19. The signs can be proven explicitly using (8) and (9).
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 insky and Shavell, concluded that type-i error reduces incentives to litigate,
 while type-2 error increases incentives to litigate. The reason for this finding
 was that type-1 errors increase the likelihood that the defendant will prevail,
 while type-2 errors increase the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail. The
 results of the Polinsky and Shavell article are not replicated here because
 they were derived under the assumption that the probability the defendant
 acted negligently is unaffected by type-i and type-2 errors.
 2.5.2. Effects on Deterrence. This section examines the effect of an
 increase in legal error on the probability that a potential injurer will take
 care under negligence. The conclusion depends on the type of equilibrium
 that results under negligence.
 In an undercompliance equilibrium in a negligence regime, the proba-
 bility that a potential injurer will be deterred (i.e., led by the threat of
 liability to take care) is
 [1 - H(cv/t)l{[p(l -0)-q02]E(vlv>cV/w)+(p- q)c}c
 g= I dG(x). (22)
 0
 Note that (22) implies g,, = g,(w,01,02); where dg,n/02 < 0, because an
 increase in the likelihood that a nonnegligent defendant will be found negli-
 gent reduces the incentives of potentially negligent actors to take care;
 where ag,,/al0 < 0, because an increase in the likelihood that a negligent
 defendant will be found nonnegligent reduces the incentives of potentially
 negligent actors to take care; where ag,,lIw > 0, because an increase in the
 probability of a negligence verdict increases incentives to take care.
 In an undercompliance equilibrium, the effect of an increase in type-2
 error on the probability that an actor is deterred is given by the following
 expression:
 dg, - g g+ dgn w (23)
 2- a02 aw a02'
 the sign of which is ambiguous because the first term in (23) is negative, and
 the terms multiplied together are both positive. Thus, in an under-
 compliance equilibrium, the effect of an increase in type-2 error on deter-
 rence is ambiguous because an increase in type-2 error reduces the incen-
 tives of potentially negligent actors to take care, but increases the incentives
 of victims to sue.
 The effect of an increase in type-i error on the probability that an actor is
 deterred in an undercompliance equilibrium is given by the following
 expression:
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 dgn _ agt + agn aw (24)
 Jo-, a0, aw ae0
 The first term in (24) is negative, the sign of the second term is ambiguous.
 The reason the sign of the second term is ambiguous is that the sign of awl
 d01 is itself ambiguous, given (21). Thus, in an undercompliance equi-
 librium, an increase in the frequency of type-i error has an ambiguous
 impact on deterrence. The impact of type-l error is ambiguous because it is
 unclear whether type-i error increases or decreases the incentives of victims
 to sue.
 In a perfect compliance equilibrium in a negligence regime, the proba-
 bility that a potential injurer will be deterred is
 (p-q)E(v)
 g = dG(x). (25)
 0
 Thus, in a perfect compliance equilibrium, small increases in the probability
 of type-i or type-2 error have no effect on deterrence. This is not to say that
 error is irrelevant insofar as deterrence is concerned. Error is not irrelevant
 because if the probability of type-2 error were driven to zero, a perfect
 compliance equilibrium would not be feasible. Iowever, an interesting im-
 plication of the divergence (or discontinuity) in marginal liability costs noted
 in Proposition 1 is that a perfect compliance equilibrium under negligence is
 fairly robust in its deterrence properties to small changes in the frequency of
 error.20
 In an overcompliance equilibrium in a negligence regime, the probability
 that a potential injurer will be deterred is
 [ 1-H(c,Jtv)](p-q)[ 02E(vlt>c,/w ) + Col
 g.n= dG(x). (26)
 0
 Note that (26) implies g, = g,,(w,Ol,02); where g,/IO1 = 0, because an
 increase in the probability of a type-i error is of no concern to the non-
 negligent; where dgnl/02 > 0, because an increase in the likelihood that a
 nonnegligent defendant will be found negligent increases the incentives of
 actors who are not potentially negligent to take care; and where ag,n/w > 0.
 The effect of increases in type-i and type-2 errors, in an overcompliance
 equilibrium, are expressed as follows:
 20. This is consistent with the analysis of "threshold effects" in Cooter.
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 d - 0, (27)
 dg,t - gn + g 3w 9(28) R02 a02 aw 002
 Given that w = 02 in an overcompliance equilibrium, the sign of (28) is
 positive. Thus, in an overcompliance equilibrium, an increase in the proba-
 bility of type-i error has no effect on deterrence, and an increase in the
 probability of type-2 error increases deterrence. The reason for this is that
 the marginal actor (i.e., the one who is almost indifferent as between taking
 care and not taking care) is, in an overcompliance equilibrium, an actor who
 is not potentially negligent. For such an actor, type-2 error is the only kind of
 error that matters, and an increase in type-2 error increases the portion of
 expected victim losses for which he in effect will be held strictly liable.
 The results under the assumption that an undercompliance equilibrium
 holds are largely in agreement with those of Polinsky and Shavell.21 How-
 ever, since their analysis does not reveal that perfect or overcompliance
 equilibria of the type described here can result, their model does not dis-
 tinguish the different effects of type-I error increases in under- and in over-
 compliance equilibria.22
 3. CONCLUSION
 It has been shown in this article that perfect and overcompliance equilibria
 can result in a negligence regime in which litigation is costly and courts err.
 It also has been shown that underdeterrence must result under negligence,
 unless the Hand formula is modified to incorporate litigation costs.
 An implication of this article is that legal error may have desirable second-
 best properties in a negligence regime in which litigation is costly. Legal
 21. Polinsky and Shavell note that type-I and type-2 errors have an ambiguous effect on
 incentives to take care because the probability of suit is affected by error. Posner (400-4) and
 Ehrlich and Posner (262-4) argue that type-1 and type-2 errors reduce incentives to take care.
 I-owever, the Posner and the Ehrlich and Posner articles fail to take into account the effects of
 error on the probability of suit.
 22. It was noted earlier that an increase in the standard of proof would increase type-i error
 and reduce type-2 error simultaneously. The results derived above can be used to examine the
 effects of an increase in the standard of proof. If X is the standard of proof, then 01 and 02 are
 both finctions of X, where d0l/dX > 0 and d02/dX < 0. The effect of an increase in the standard
 of proof on the probability of negligence verdict is then given by the formula
 dw _ aw dO, aow dO2
 dX aOl dX a02 dX'
 which can be used to reach conclusions similar to those derived in the text.
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 error can offset or counterbalance the tendency of a negligence regime in
 which litigation is costly to result in undercompliance and underdeterrence
 (see Ordover, 1978; Hylton). Thus, on deterrence grounds alone (i.e.,
 whether the enforcement regime gives actors incentives to exercise socially
 optimal precaution), it is unclear whether a negligence regime in which
 there is no legal error is superior to one in which there is legal error.23
 The model developed in this article has also been used to show that the
 effects of increases in legal error on incentives to sue, and on deterrence, are
 more complicated than has been suggested in previous analyses. In particu-
 lar, it is shown that the effects depend on the type of equilibrium that is
 observed.
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